DEVELOPMENT CONTROL POLICY GUIDANCE NOTE 3

Planning Out Crime in New Development

JUNE 2001



This guidance note is aimed at developers, architects and all those with an interest in the development of sites with a view to reducing incidents involving crime. Advice is set out as follows:

Basic Principles

Major Land Use Considerations:

- Housing
- Commercial/industrial Sites and Premises
- Retail Units

Detailed Design Considerations:

- Footpaths and Access Points
- Riverside and Canalside Footpaths
- Open Space and Play Areas
- Landscaping
- Outdoor Car Parking Areas
- Lighting

Contacts

Appendices

- Plant Species (Appendix 1)
- UDP Policy EN1/5 (Appendix 2)



1 - INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 Crime prevention is increasingly being seen as a legitimate concern of the planning system and the need to incorporate crime prevention measures into the layout and design of new developments is recognised by Central Government in a number of Circulars and Planning Policy Guidance Notes (PPG's).
- 1.2 This Development Control Policy Guidance Note gives advice to all those involved in the planning process, including developers, architects and builders on measures which can be incorporated into the design of new developments to reduce the fear of crime and lessen future opportunities for crime in Bury. It expands upon the Council's planning policy on the use of such measures which is set out in Policy EN1/5 of the Bury Unitary Development Plan, and supplements the Government's own planning guidance on this subject, particularly that contained in Circular 5/94 "Planning Out Crime", (February 1994). Further details on the policy background to this Guidance Note can be found in Appendix 2.
- 1.3 Section 17 of the 'Crime and Disorder Act 1998' requires that all local authorities consider crime and disorder reduction while exercising all their duties. Bury Metropolitan Borough Council considers the implementation of this guidance as paramount in response to Bury's Crime and Disorder Strategy. It is hoped that the principles of this Guidance Note will compliment the key priorities selected by Bury's Community Safety Partnership as part of the Strategy.
- 1.4 It should be noted that the advice contained in this document is not exhaustive and other appropriate solutions may be suitable in certain circumstances. Interested persons may also wish to refer to the documents listed in Section 5 under 'Background Documents' for further explanation and detail relating to specific types of development.

Background

- 1.5 The vast majority of crimes recorded in the UK are committed against property. A much smaller but equally important element involves violent crimes against an individual. In both cases the layout and design of buildings and the spaces around them can be an important factor in helping to make areas less vulnerable and deterring to would-be criminals.
- 1.6 In particular, attention to detail and the careful design of new developments, such as that which improves surveillance, reduces dark or blind spots and avoids creating obvious temptations to would-be criminals, can do much to reduce both actual crime and fear of crime.
- 1.7 It should also be emphasised that in any new development, crime prevention features should be incorporated into the design process at an early stage; once a development has been completed, the main opportunity to incorporate crime prevention measures will have been lost. It is vitally important, therefore, that the use of crime prevention measures should feature at the earliest opportunity in discussions with the Local Planning Authority ideally at the outset of the design process.

- 1.8 The approach adopted by this guidance note is based on Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design or CPTED, a multi-disciplinary approach to reducing crime and increasing perceived safety. CPTED acknowledges that the layout and design of the built environment can create or reduce opportunities for criminal behaviour and disorder. This strategy seeks to create a physical environment conducive to the overall security of the community. The principles of CPTED include:
 - defensible space
 - improved surveillance
 - promotion of territoriality
 - community interaction
 - environmental balance
 - circulation management
 - the avoidance of crime generators
- 1.9 Although this document goes some way to addressing many of the main principles of CPTED, those with an interest in this approach are advised to consult Police Architectural Liaison Officers and should also take note of 'Designing out Crime', a series of documents providing advice on approaches to reducing crime for a range of development types and attaining the 'Secured by Design' award. These documents can be obtained free of charge from the Architectural Liaison Unit (ALU).



Further information is provided in Appendix 3 of this document. Contact details for the ALU are supplied in Section 6.

2 - ADVICE

- 2.1 This section develops the broad policy framework set out under UDP policy EN1/5 and is structured around three main headings:
 - <u>Basic Principles</u>, which sets out four basic principles which are applicable to any attempt to reduce crime through urban design.
 - <u>Major Land Use Considerations</u>, which outlines some of the main design measures which can help to reduce crime in residential, commercial/industrial and shopping/town centre developments.
 - <u>Detailed Design Considerations</u>, which provide more detailed guidance on specific elements of urban design which may be common to a wide range of land uses and developments.

Basic Principles

- Use natural surveillance as a primary aid towards crime reduction.
- Use defensible space.
- Design for both the safety of people and the security of property.
- Do not design to give the impression of safety where real danger exists.
- 2.2 The design principles set out above are those which can be broadly applied to a wide range of development situations and can be considered to form the bedrock of "planning out crime".
- 2.3 Of these principles, the use of natural surveillance is probably the most important weapon against crime. Criminals like easy opportunities; they do not like being seen or heard. The chances are that if there is a likelihood of being seen or heard, they will not bother. People and properties which can be seen, be it from buildings or passers-by, are therefore usually less vulnerable than those which are out of sight.
- 2.4 The use of defensible space is also an important principle and is particularly effective when used with designs which enhance natural surveillance. "Defensible space" is essentially concerned with the adoption of techniques which engender a feeling of territoriality, thereby allowing people to feel that they have control or influence over the use of space around them. This can be achieved by using both real and symbolic barriers, for example, fencing, gates, narrowed entrances and changes in road surface texture and colour. Ultimately, the aim should be to use defensible space to ensure that people are empowered with a feeling of ownership of the space around them, and conversely to ensure that intruders are made to feel a sense of uneasiness.

- 2.5 It is important too that when considering building or vehicle security, developers should not forget the need to protect people and reduce the fear of crime. Individuals are most at risk when walking in public areas at night without the protection which other pedestrians or people in buildings and passing vehicles offer. Measures should be taken to protect these people, for instance through the careful design of spaces around buildings to avoid deep reveals, recesses and other 'blind spots' and the use of lighting in vulnerable areas.
- 2.6 Finally, care should be taken to ensure that people are not given a false sense of security through the incorporation of limited and cosmetic crime prevention techniques where a real risk exists and a more serious approach is required. For example, providing a CCTV system without having regard to other factors affecting the security of the property, its users and the surrounding area.

Major Land Use Considerations

2.7 The basic principles outlined above can be applied to the design of most, if not all, developments. Even so, the crime prevention issues facing the designer will vary according to the nature of the development being considered. It follows, therefore, that the development of different types of land use will require the implementation of the basic principles in a different manner. Accordingly, this section examines the use of crime prevention techniques in three of the most common development situations - housing, commercial/industrial and retail.

Housing

- Develop a mixture of housing types on any one site where possible.
- Consider the grouping of houses where appropriate.
- Definitive boundary treatment of a development should be considered, as open plan frontages can sometimes encourage misuse.
- Avoid landscaping which creates hiding places.
- Avoid landscaping which obscures the house frontage.
- Accommodation above shops should be easily recognisable as such, and have adequate security/lighting systems for the occupiers.
- Provide remote pedestrian routes only where they are essential and, if possible, where they are overlooked.
- Avoid communal car parking areas where possible, or make provision to incorporate security measures
- Ensure that rear gardens of properties adjoin each other where possible.
- Control access to the rear of properties from the frontage by a strong lockable gate.
- Ensure play areas are highly visible from surrounding housing.
- Developers should be familiar with the main principles of target hardening.
- Avoid deck access landings to properties
- Clear signage and numbering on housing estates avoids confusion

- 2.8 Successful crime prevention on housing developments is a product of a wide variety of factors, some of which lie outside the scope of this guidance. However, the basic design principles outlined above can make an important contribution to crime prevention.
- 2.9 As mentioned in paragraph 2.3, the use of natural surveillance is probably the most important crime prevention technique available to the designer. However, the use of natural surveillance can be severely restricted on housing estates where the majority of residents are absent during the day as a result of attending work. To some extent ensuring that a development incorporates a mix of house types and tenures, and therefore households, can increase the probability that more of an estate's population will be in attendance during the day. This increases the potential for natural surveillance and thus helps to deter crime.
- 2.10 The degree of natural surveillance can also be enhanced through the use of the layout of an estate. Giving thought to the physical form of an estate, and the use of techniques, such as changes in road surface can create a feeling of territoriality.

Increasing a sense of territoriality in new housing estates.



2.11 Although strangers may be more readily noticed where there are no through routes for pedestrians or vehicles, reducing the permeability of a development may have its disadvantages by limiting the scope for access to nearby community and public transport facilities and isolating many sections of the estate from the whole. Indeed, encouraging community interaction can be used to improve estate security simply by allowing both the development of individual relationships, and the development of a sense of community in which people share concerns about the wider estate rather than just the cul-de-sac in which they live. In some instances, therefore, there will be a need to strike the right balance between competing objectives.

- 2.12 Personal safety issues are also important when designing housing estates. In particular attention should be paid to the location and design of landscaped areas which should be designed in such a way as to ensure that they cannot be used as potential hiding places by intruders and would-be assailants. Thus, if high growing shrubs are to be included in a landscaped area they should be set well back from pedestrian routes. Personal safety within the curtilage of a dwelling can be enhanced by ensuring that planted areas adjacent to windows and doors contain only low level shrubs.
- 2.13 Personal safety should also be taken into account when designing the routes of footpaths. Primarily, footpaths should link areas of demand such as schools, shops and bus stops this is likely to increase their use, and thus their safety. Pedestrian routes should be overlooked where possible. Proposals that lead people to an unsafe environment should be discouraged. To reduce the fear of crime, a number of approaches should be considered at the initial design stage. The design and/or siting of footpaths which would have poor natural surveillance should be discouraged if at all possible. The use of footpaths remote from main vehicular routes should be avoided, but may be acceptable if they are well overlooked, well illuminated and maintain long straight lines of the site. Excess access routes can encourage escape routes by criminals.

The locating of paths alongside houses and their gardens should be avoided, and links between one or more cul-de-sacs are not recommended. For proposals beyond the design stage, an attempt should be made to incorporate escape routes which would allow a potential attack victim to exit the area quickly.

- 2.14 For reasons of personal safety and vehicle security, communal parking areas are usually best avoided. Vehicles are safest when locked in a garage; if this is not practical, parking spaces should be within the curtilage of the property, secured by a gate, where practicable and easily visible from the dwelling.
- 2.15 Ideally, communal parking should be in small groups, well over looked from the main aspect of the properties, preferably within the owners view, and should not be unduly screened by walls or planting. Communal parking to the rear should be avoided as it can create personal safety issues. If it cannot be avoided, it is suggested that there should be direct access to buildings serviced by the car parking, with consideration given to the use of gated entrances/exits and the use of CCTV. Where open communal parking spaces are intended for use by occupants in adjacent properties, it may be preferable to dedicate spaces to individual residences, thus avoiding disputes between neighbours and visitors. Such car parks should be formally laid out clearly identifying spaces, flow directions and good signage.

- 2.16 The curtilage of a dwelling can be protected through ensuring that gardens back onto each other and that side entrances are secured by a strong lockable gate. Houses with gardens that back on to each other offer a level of mutual protection and enjoy a degree of natural surveillance over each other. Houses with paths or open space to the rear may be considered an easier target by a potential intruder.
- 2.17 Finally, the applicant should consider the improvement of building security standards at the outset. More commonly known as target hardening, there are a number of points to be taken into account. Obstacles such as locks and security screens should be installed to deter thieves. Doors, windows and halls should be made more secure, and the quality of exterior doors, door frames, hinges and locks must be high. Exterior lighting, alarm systems, key control or electronic access control systems can add to security.



Exposed cables can leave property vulnerable to crime

For further information on target hardening your proposed development, please contact the ALU. Details are provided in Section 6.

2.18 Houses with gable ends exposed to public spaces – for example end terraces on pavement, are vulnerable to vandalism and misuse, playing of ball games – causing annoyance etc. It would therefore, be desirable to protect these areas by enclosing boundaries or deep verges with dense shrubbery.

Commercial/Industrial Sites and Premises


- The perimeter of the site/premises should be clearly defined and appropriate boundary treatment/fencing incorporated.
- Entrances into the site should be gated, utilising a strong locking mechanism and well overlooked by buildings or adjoining premises.
- Detailed master planning can result in effective and economical security management practices.
- Views into the site should be maximised.
- Pedestrian access should be as direct as possible from the main road to the main entrance of the building.
- Car parking areas should be visible from the premises which they are serving and be well illuminated.
- Estates should be arranged such that service areas do not have an "open" aspect to the rear. The use of a "back-to-back" design is recommended.
- Particular attention should be paid to the lighting of vulnerable rear
- The aim should be to maximise the opportunity for surveillance from outside the site.
- Doors, windows and service provisions (e.g. alarm systems, telephone lines) may require greater security precautions than domestic buildings.
- The rear area of buildings are often remote and secure boundaries should be provided.
- 2.19 Commercial and industrial areas are often large in scale and as such their design has a major impact upon urban quality. This should be borne in mind when considering the guidance contained within this document. Commercial areas have different characteristics to residential areas and as such require a different approach to crime prevention. In particular, commercial areas are often unoccupied outside trading hours and overnight. This means that natural surveillance may not always be possible or may be limited and such development may require extra security precautions. By adopting shift work patterns, surveillance opportunity and movement throughout the site 24 hours a day is achievable.

2.20 Particular attention should be paid to the creation of defensible space by using visually strong site boundaries and gated entrances/exits to clearly define and accentuate the private nature of the site. Symbolic features and physical boundaries enhance the security of a site at the entrance. Greater Manchester Police (GMP) design guidelines offer advice on the design of commercial and retail parks - see background documents and contacts for details.



Careful design can limit easy access

- 2.21 Natural surveillance can be maximised by ensuring that the site boundaries are designed in such a way as to maximise views into and through the site. Sites should therefore be designed to ensure that buildings and landscaping do not obstruct views into the site, for instance by ensuring that buildings are set back from the site boundary and by incorporating low growing shrubs adjacent to boundary fences.
- 2.22 To increase the natural surveillance of pedestrians entering and leaving the site it is also desirable for the principal pedestrian access to be located as close to the main road as possible, and be visible from it; staff should be encouraged to use this rather than rear or more secluded access points at quiet periods. The plan form of the building will evolve from many influences. However, multi-faceted elevations, recesses and deep reveals create hiding places and should be avoided.





- 2.23 Communal car parking is often provided on commercial sites. This should be designed in such a way as to be visible from adjacent buildings and should be well illuminated. Where clusters of buildings exist, designated parking areas should be provided to service individual units. The zoning of car parks dedicated to users encourages occupiers to take 'ownership' of their spaces.
- 2.24 As with housing, industrial units should be designed so that vulnerable areas within the building curtilage, such as those connected with servicing and storage areas, typically located to the rear of the premises, back on to each other thereby providing a degree of mutual protection. Such areas should be well illuminated to increase the opportunity for natural surveillance and should incorporate the use of CCTV if possible.
- 2.25 Finally, when premises are in the public view it is important to consider the impact extra security measures will have on the street scene, the building's appearance and the amenity of neighbouring residential areas. Unsightly overpowering security arrangements, fencing and boundary treatments should be avoided and more visually appealing methods considered (for example using railings instead of solid fences).

Retail Units

- Ram-raiding can be discouraged through the use of barrier features such as raised flower beds, bollards and stall risers.
- Particular attention should be paid to securing the rear of the retail unit, with an emphasis on lighting, the number and location or windows and types of doors and locks.
- Shutters can protect a shop frontage but are widely viewed as contributing to a "fortress" mentality. As such shutter design should be carefully chosen, for example open slatted shutters and internal shuttering can have a reduced impact on the street scene.
- Accommodation above shops should be accessible from the front.
 When easily recognised as living space, development can be designed in such a way as to provide natural surveillance.

2.26 Retail units are particular vulnerable to theft, particularly through the shop frontage. Ram raiding can be discouraged by the location of barriers such as bollards, pillars, raised flower beds or railings, in front of the unit, whilst the windows/door can be protected by the use of shutters. However, the use of such techniques can engender a fortress mentality. As such, if shutters are considered necessary for shopfronts it is preferable that they are of a type which fit inside the window and are perforated to allow surveillance of the premises, as well as allowing the window display to be visible from the street. If this is not possible and external grilles are essential, they too should be similar in nature to the internal type described above. Where internal lighting from a retail unit spills out into the street, it can enhance existing street-lighting arrangements as well as increase perceived safety. This practice is welcomed, and is even efficient where security shutters are in use.



New development protected from ram raiding

2.27 It is important to emphasise that the rear of a shop unit should not neglected. particular, In reducing the number of windows, ensuring the rear is illuminated and utilising strong doors and locks can go some way towards ensuring a more secure unit. Unauthorised access into and around shop units should be prevented.



The rear of premises should always be secured

2.28 The occupation of spaces above shops can act as an obstacle to burglary and street crime. Although this form of crime prevention may not always deter offenders, dwelling spaces should be easily recognisable as residential accommodation. It is important that accommodation above retail premises is accessible from the front. Wherever possible, rear access to first floor flats or maisonettes should be avoided as the backs of shops contain service yards may be intimidating and offer poor surveillance'. In addition, the regular cleaning of facades, and the inclusion of appropriate lighting and security systems would be more likely to convey this message of occupation to would be criminals. At the earlier stages, there is also an opportunity to foster more casual surveillance into the design and interior layout of new flats, in order to maximise potential surveillance practices.

3 - DETAILED DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

3.1 The previous two sections have considered basic principles and the application of these to different development situations. The intention of this section is to provide more guidance on detailed design issues which are common to a range of land uses, such as the design of footpaths and access points, open space and car parking areas, and the use of lighting.

Footpaths and Access Points

- Paths should be overlooked.
- Increase surveillance by encouraging usage.
- Border treatment and fencing should be designed to allow visibility of and by users.
- Footpaths should be wide, well-lit and not obscured by planting.
- Where possible avoid directing footpaths along the rear of properties.
- Avoid narrow paths with high boundaries between premises.
- 3.2 Pedestrians feel safest when they can be seen. Occupied buildings and passing traffic both offer surveillance; so too do other pedestrians.

3.3 Clear signposting and regular maintenance, particularly ensuring that lights work and plants do not obscure views, will encourage more people to use a certain path. This in itself will offer greater security and reduce the fear of crime. By ensuring that footpaths follow short, direct and safe routes, the problem of people creating their own paths following the quickest desire line can be avoided. Sharp bends restrict views and should be avoided if possible; a clear area of 2-3 metres should also be provided on both sides of a footpath if possible; this will allow better views along the path and will avoid creating potential hiding places. All footways employing landscaped verges should have a low growth verge of a maximum height of approximately 800mm and 1.5 metres in width.



Personal safety should be a key consideration at the design stage of footpaths and associated development.

- 3.4 Lighting columns along footpaths should be positioned frequently and regularly so as to avoid pools of darkness.
- 3.5 Ideally, footpaths should not be directed around the rear of properties it may be more difficult to maintain surveillance of a path to the rear of houses, and a footpath to the rear can also make access to the property easier for a would-be intruder. Where a path to the rear of a property is unavoidable, as it may be on terraced housing schemes, it is important that methods of denoting or suggesting ownership and restricting its use to the occupiers are utilised. The use of a strong gate at the path entrance is recommended as a minimum security feature. Such a gate should be difficult to climb and be located in full view of neighbouring properties. Additionally, changes in surface colour and/or texture can also be used to denote the private space.

For advice relating specifically to cycle path safety, please refer to the guidance produced by Sustrans and Association of Chief Police Officers. Details of this document can be found in Section 5 of this guidance note.

Riverside and Canalside Footpaths

- Riverside footpaths should be an integral part of the development.
- Entrances and exit points should have an open feel, be well illuminated and be clearly visible from surrounding development.
- Riverside footpaths should be of a reasonable width, incorporate easily maintained low level landscaping.
- Landscaping should be used to protect the boundaries of adjacent properties.
- 3.6 The creation of footpath links should be discouraged. If this is unavoidable, links should be short, direct and avoid sharp bends and blindspots.
- 3.7 The previous paragraphs have been concerned with the design of footpaths in general. These principles should be adopted in all locations. However, the provision of footpaths in river and canalside locations requires particular attention.
- 3.8 Riverside and canalside areas are particularly important features in the Borough's landscape. Because of this it is an objective of the UDP to improve the character of the Borough's river valleys and canalside areas, in part through encouraging increased public access to these areas, (see UDP Policies EN10/2 and OL5/3, both titled "Riverside and Canalside Development in Urban Areas").
- 3.9 The development of hard land uses adjacent to the canalside or riverside areas offers an important opportunity to meet this objective. Where development occurs adjacent to the canalside or riverside, the UDP encourages the incorporation of an open corridor which incorporates a footpath along side the water feature.
- 3.10 The Council is mindful that such corridors have to be planned particularly carefully so that they do not actually encourage crime by making it too easy for a would be criminal to enter and exit an area undetected.
- 3.11 For this reason, a riverside corridor area should be planned from the outset as an integral part of the development indeed it should be seen as being "owned" by the wider development, for example through changes in surface, clearly delineated boundaries, overlooking by the remainder of the development and by encouraging usage. Pedestrian control furniture should be employed where possible to discourage misuse by bicycles, etc.
- 3.12 In particular, the points at which the corridor is accessed should be open and clearly overlooked. It is considered bad practice to have an entrance point which is enclosed or obscured, for example a pathway situated between the gable ends of two properties.

- 3.13 Corridors should not have an enclosed feeling created by being too narrow. Narrow corridors do not encourage usage and are potentially dangerous as they offer little scope for avoiding a would-be assailant. Again, openness is important; if the corridor is open to the remainder of the development this provides a feeling of space, natural surveillance and the potential of escape should it be required.
- 3.14 Canal and Riverside paths, many of which are remote from the urban corridors and maintain poor levels of surveillance, are conduits for criminal activity and become popular targets when they pass close to or through housing estates. For new developments, there is an opportunity to consider the design of such paths and potential problems. Where dedicated access routes do not enter the site, estates should be strongly secured from the path by a definite line of fencing/walling or dense and defensible planting, in order to minimise the fear of crime or the risk of attacking vulnerable buildings close to these walkways.
- 3.15 Personal safety and natural surveillance can be further improved by ensuring that corridors and their entrances/exits are well illuminated.
- 3.16 In more highly developed urban areas, such as town centres and higher density housing areas, it may be more appropriate for riverside and canalside areas to be treated with hard surfacing. Although even in such situations it would be preferable to have hard surfacing on one side of a watercourse and a soft offside. This approach is favoured in order to compliment other policies and supplementary planning guidance which aims to strengthen wildlife corridors and links. Boundary treatments should also reflect a more formal approach with the use of such elements as walls, railings and gates, where appropriate.
- 3.17 Finally, vulnerable areas, such as those adjacent to boundary fencing, can be protected by the use of thorny species of shrub. Access over boundary fencing can be made more difficult if the shrubs are placed on both sides of the fencing, see appendix 2 for suggested plant species.

Open Space and Play Areas

- Make use of surveillance from buildings which overlook the open space.
- Provide escape routes through open areas.
- 3.18 Areas of open space, including children's play areas, will be safer if visible from nearby houses and unobscured by landscaping. Layouts where rear gardens adjoin open space should be avoided. Rear gardens are private spaces and may not offer natural surveillance of play areas. Play areas, where provided, should therefore be designed as an integral part of the layout and not simply as an afterthought situated on a piece of unusable backland. Care should be taken to locate play areas in such a manner as to minimise disturbance to nearby residents, but maintain surveillance and perceived safety.

- 3.19 In some instances, it may be necessary to enclose a play area with physical boundaries, in order to restrict access by vandals and dogs. Play spaces should have low boundary protection in open areas. High fencing may be appropriate in areas where a secure gated boundary is essential, e.g. adjacent terraced streets.
- 3.20 Open areas should also have escape routes these are routes out of an open area where there is a good chance of being seen and therefore deterring a would-be attacker.

Landscaping

- High growing shrubs should be set back at least 1.5 metres from the edge of paths.
- Dense or tall growing shrub planting should be kept away from doorways and windows.
- Use thorny species of shrub to protect vulnerable areas.
- Incorporate escape routes into larger areas of landscaping.
- 3.21 Areas of dense landscaping may be used as hiding places by would-be attackers. Planting which is set back from a path allows a victim more time to see an attacker, reducing the element of surprise. Planting should be set back approximately 2-3 m from the edge of footpaths to allow views along the path. Different species grow at different rates, and care should be taken to ensure that they will not obscure lighting, block escape routes or provide hiding places for an attacker when fully mature.
- 3.22 The use of shrubs within the curtilage of a dwelling should be carefully thought out. Schemes should be designed so as to ensure that windows and doors are not obscured and that shrubs cannot be used as a hiding place adjacent to doors and windows. The use of thorny shrubs, however, can be a positive crime prevention feature as they can protect vulnerable areas, such as a site boundary, from intruders, see appendix 2 for suggested species.
- 3.23 As with other open areas, developers should ensure that escape routes are incorporated where there is pedestrian access through large landscaped areas.

Outdoor Car Parking Areas

- Surface car parks should be designed to be overlooked from the road and occupied buildings.
- Circulation routes that are easily identified and properly marked are a safer environment for pedestrians and vehicles.
- Lighting should be located so that circulation routes and parking bays are well illuminated.
- The use of height restrictors and narrowed entrances can control access to a car park.
- Pedestrian routes to and from a car park should be designed so as to allow maximum surveillance both from within the car park and from outside.
- Secure management may be enhanced by the use of well sign posted but minimal access routes.
- Use low maintenance/low growing landscaping.
- The use of CCTV should be considered where appropriate.
- Defined boundaries are required to control movement on and off the site.
- 3.24 The use of natural surveillance from roads and buildings should be a key consideration in designing parking areas, whether they be communal areas within commercial or residential developments, or private spaces within the curtilage of a building.
- 3.25 Although planting can be used to soften the impact of a potentially visually boring or unsightly development, such as a car park, the primary objective should always be to ensure that views of the car park and its users are not obscured.
- 3.26 Natural surveillance can be greatly improved by the appropriate location of lighting. When considering lighting issues, particular care should be taken to ensure that as much of the car park and its periphery as possible is illuminated. Illuminating only access points leaves large areas of darkness for motorists to walk through on their way to or from their vehicle and vehicles more vulnerable to break-in's or being stolen.
- 3.27 A car park is a magnet for crime. Secure management can be achieved by the combination of a well sign-posted car park, with minimal access routes. Where there is little or no chance of natural surveillance, good quality high definition CCTV should be considered. The use of CCTV at access points may be

- appropriate. Such monitoring should provide an effective deterrent to would-be criminals. CCTV can be used to enhance a raft of security measures on a car park, but consideration should be given to an adequate monitoring system.
- 3.28 Developers wishing to have their car parks designed to meet the minimum standards of the ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) Secured Car Park award scheme may contact the police for further advice (contact details in Section 6 and Appendix 3).

Lighting

- Good illumination is an important element of good natural surveillance.
- Lighting should be used to illuminate vulnerable areas.
- Pools of lighting with dark areas between should be avoided.
- Lighting should be vandal proof.
- Lighting should respect the requirements of other land users.
- Lighting design can be easily incorporated into other schemes
- 3.29 Designers should not rely solely on street lighting to provide a deterrent to crime. However, the use of effective illumination when combined with other crime prevention measures can be a key factor in combating crime. Good illumination can be particularly effective when used in conjunction with high levels of natural surveillance.
- 3.30 Lighting should be designed to provide a consistent level of avoiding illumination pools of darkness which may be used to hide an intruder or would-be attacker. There should be particular emphasis on ensuring that vulnerable areas, such as the entrances and exits to site and buildings, footpaths and pedestrian areas and car parking areas, are well illuminated. Lighting will be useful where buildings are well overlooked. Alternatively, providing illumination to remote or isolated areas (e.g. the rear of buildings) may aid unauthorised congregation or criminal activity. In the case of



Multi-Functional Lighting

dwellings above shops, lighting schemes can assist in making it clear that the upper floors of the building are occupied, in addition to supporting the concept of casual surveillance.

- 3.31 As well as attempting to reduce crime and the fear of and actual crime, effective lighting schemes can be integrated into the design of a new building. As well as its primary function, lighting schemes can sometimes be incorporated into public art, either upon the building itself, or detached from it. (See Development Control Policy Guidance Note 4, 'Percent for Art' for further details).
- 3.32 Lighting itself can be subject to crime in the form of vandalism. It is a matter of common sense, therefore, that in order to ensure its continued effectiveness, lighting should be located as far as possible to deter vandalism and be of vandal proof construction.
- 3.33 Although the use of lighting is an important design feature, regard should be had to its possible negative impact on other users, such as glare. Particular attention should be given to the focus and intensity of lighting in order to ensure that it is not unnecessarily obtrusive. The use of lighting which incorporates passive infrared detector controls is one method of protecting premises whilst reducing obtrusiveness.

4 - CONCLUSION

- 4.1 The aim of this guidance has been to make a positive contribution to reducing the opportunity for crime upon new developments. It seeks to promote a better understanding of issues relating to "designing out crime" on new developments and to highlight the importance which the Council places on the use of the principles and techniques which can help to reduce opportunities for crime.
- 4.2 Much of the guidance contained in this document is based on common sense and should be readily incorporated into the design of any development. The importance which the Council places upon this issue should not be underestimated, and as such this guidance note, and the UDP Policy upon which it is based, will form a material consideration when considering planning applications and at planning appeals.
- 4.3 However, in implementing both Policy EN1/5 of the UDP, and this Guidance note, the Council is willing to negotiate with developers in order to achieve the best solution for all parties.
- 4.4 The 'Secured by Design' award scheme is an initiative to encourage architects, designers, planners, builders and all persons involved in the design process to adopt crime prevention measures. Builders and developers have a marketing opportunity to advertise homes, offices, industrial buildings, etc. as being 'secured by design', in addition to making use of the SBD logo (details on how to contact the Greater Manchester Police Architectural Liaison Unit (ALU) can be found in Section 6 and Appendix 3).

5 - BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS

- Armitage, Rachel, 'An Evaluation of Secured by Design Housing within West Yorkshire', Home Office Briefing Note 7/00.
- The Bury Unitary Development Plan, BMBC (August 1997);
- Development Control Planning Policy Guidance Note 4 'Percent for Art'
 BMBC (2000/01 yet to be published);
- Planning Policy Guidance Note 1 "General Policies and Principles", DETR (February 1997);
- Planning Policy Guidance Note 12 "Development Plans", DETR (December 1999):
- Designing out Crime, Greater Manchester Police Architectural Liaison Unit (1998);
- Police Architectural Liaison Manual of Guidance, Home Office (1994);
- Crime Prevention Circular 1/84, DoE (1984);
- Planning out Crime Circular 5/94, DETR (1994);
- Section 17: Crime & Disorder Act, Home Office(1998);
- Crime & Disorder Act 1998 Section 17 (Circular 793/99) Local Government Association & NACRO (1999);
- Crime and Disorder Implementing a practical response to Section 17,
 North West Community Safety Forum (2000);

6 - CONTACTS

For information on the implementation of Policy EN 1/5 of the Bury UDP contact:

Anne-Marie Greene, Planning Officer (Planning Policy)

Bury Metropolitan Borough Council

Department of Development and Environmental Services

Planning Division

Craig house

5 Bank Street

Bury

BL9 ODN

Tel: 0161 253 6154

E-mail: a.m.greene@bury.gov.uk

For further information about free advice on specific design implications of your development proposal contact:

Architectural Liaison Unit (ALU)

Greater Manchester Police Head Quarters

Community Affairs Department

Chester House

Boyer Street

Manchester M16 ORE

Tel: 0161 856 2255

E-mail: arch.liaison@gmp.police.uk Web site: www.securedbydesign.com

APPENDIX 1 - PLANT SPECIES

The following is a list of plant species which are considered as suitable for defensible planting:

- Holly Ilex aquifolium
- Hawthorn Crataegus spp
- Barberry Berberis Julanae
- Firethorn Pyracantha spp
- Blackthorn Prunus spinosa
- Rose Rosa rugosa/Rosa canina
- Bramble Rubus

This list is not exhaustive. Advice may be sought from the Council, as to incorporating suitable plants into the landscape scheme of your development.

APPENDIX 2 - POLICY CONTEXT

National Guidance

Specific Government guidance-on the relationship between the planning system and crime prevention is contained in Circular 1/84 "Crime Prevention" (January 1984), and Circular 5/94 "Planning Out Crime". Circular 1/84, which is still extant, provides general advice on the role of planning in crime prevention and encourages liaison with the police. More detailed advice can be found in the more recent Circular 5/94, where paragraph 3 explicitly states that:

"Crime prevention is capable of being a material consideration when planning applications are considered"

In considering the use of crime prevention principles and techniques both PPG1 and Circular 5/94 advocate a flexible approach in order to ensure that crime prevention solutions are designed to reflect local circumstances. The Circular also acknowledges that there needs to be a balanced approach to design which reconciles visual quality with the proposed crime prevention techniques. Failure to address the issue adequately may lead to applications for planning permission being refused.

Bury Unitary Development Plan

The Bury Unitary Development Plan (UDP) provides the local planning policy framework which guides development in the Borough. The UDP addresses the issue of planning and crime prevention through Policy EN1/5 - Crime Prevention. This policy encourages the utilisation of urban design to discourage crime within new developments. It also specifies those principles and techniques which should

be considered in designing new proposals and which will be used when assessing planning applications. This Policy and its justification are set out below:

EN 1/5 - Crime Prevention

The Council will encourage development proposals which include environmentally sensitive design features aimed at discouraging crime. In assessing development proposals particular attention will be paid to:

- a) the use and creation of defensible space;
- b) the creation of opportunities for natural surveillance;
- c) the location and design of street lighting;
- d) the location of footpaths and access points;
- e) the location and design of parking facilities;
- f) the design of landscaping.

Justification

Much can be done to reduce opportunities for crime through management, design or changes in the environment. The design and layout of new proposals can make crime more difficult to commit and/or increase the risk of detection for potential offenders. Measures can include: improving security and the siting of car parks and open spaces so that they are visible from surrounding buildings; higher standards of street lighting; walls, footpaths and landscaping set out so that blind spots are avoided.

It should be noted that the UDP also contains a number of policies which relate to the general design and layout of new developments, and the redevelopment of existing uses, and which should also be considered along with the above policy and this guidance.

APPENDIX 3 - CRIME REDUCTION - GMP



Security is a design concept

When you hear the word **SECURITY**, are the first things you think of locks and bars?

Well, security is much more than that. Security is a design concept that should and can be included in your schemes at every level, from the way the buildings sit on the site to the layout and construction of the buildings themselves.

Everybody agrees that adequate security is essential and it is not expensive if it is included from the start.

Greater Manchester Police Architectural Liaison Service offers free advice on how to make your schemes more secure. Why not talk to us before making your planning application? It costs nothing but it could save you thousands.

Call: 0161 856 2255

Fax: 0161 856 2256

E-mail: arch.liaison@gmp.police.uk

Write to: The Architectural Liaison Unit,

Community Affairs Branch Greater Manchester Police Chester House Boyer Street Manchester M16 ORE

The Bury Unitary Development Plan (UDP) was adopted in August 1997.

Supplementary Planning Guidance has been produced in the form of Development Control Policy Guidance Notes to support the adopted UDP. These Notes give a more formal basis to advice which is given to applicants on a regular basis.

This Note was approved by the <u>Council's Cabinet and Executive Committee</u> (on 11th and 18th July Respectively). A statement on the consultation and publicity exercise undertaken in the preparation of this Note is available on request.

Any queries you may have regarding this Note or the Bury UDP in general should be directed to the UDP team on 0161 253 5283.